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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court formulated the inevitable
discovery exception in Nix v. Williams.' The inevitable discov-
ery exception presently permits the admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence if the prosecution can demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence would have
been obtained by other lawful means.2 Considerations of due
process require that the inevitable discovery exception be re-
examined and refined. To ensure that the inevitable discovery
exception is consistent with constitutional values, a good faith
requirement should be added.
THE BASIS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States,3 the United
States Supreme Court mandated the exclusion of evidence ob-
t John E. Fennelly is a Nineteenth CircuitJudge in Stuart, Florida. Judge Fen-
nelly received his Master of Judicial Studies from the University of Nevada/Reno in
1991. He received his J.D. wth Honors from the Illinois Institute of Technology/
Kent College of Law in 1976 and his A.B. cum laude from Loyola University of Chi-
cago in 1970. Judge Fennelly has been a police officer for the Chicago Police Depart-
ment, a special agent for the U.S. Treasury Department, Department of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms, and a felony prosecutor. In 1990, Judge Fennelly was named
"Outstanding Jurist" by the Florida Bar, Young Lawyer's Division.
1. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
2. Id. at 444.
3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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tained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. In Weeks,
both state and federal officers conducted warrantless searches
of Weeks' residence and obtained evidence used to convict him
of federal lottery violations. The Supreme Court advanced
two reasons for excluding the evidence: the fact that the fourth
amendment exists and must be given meaning4 and the obliga-
tion of the courts to uphold the fourth amendment.5 Both the-
ories were based on the substance of the fourth amendment.
Although Weeks applied only to prosecutions in federal
court, some state appellate courts reached similar results. The
state courts construed state constitutional provisions to ex-
clude evidence obtained through illegal police activity. How-
ever, the state courts did not adopt the exclusionary rule for
the purpose of deterring unlawful police activity. Instead,
Weeks was used as an interpretive guide for state constitutional
provisions. Most of these decisions centered on an ethical
analysis of judicial duty with respect to the vindication of con-
stitutional guarantees. Conversely, state courts favoring an ex-
clusionary rule reasoned that the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence was necessary to protect constitutional
rights and to promote fairness in the administration ofjustice.6
4. Id. at 393. The Weeks Court advanced a necessity rationale: the fourth
amendment would be meaningless if the courts allow the admission of illegally seized
evidence.
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the
Constitution.
Id.
5. Id. at 392. The Weeks Court argued that it was the obligation of "all entrusted
under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws" to give effect to fourth
amendment limitations. Id. "Illegal searches or seizures should find no sanction in
the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights." Id. The judiciary has a duty to exclude
illegally seized evidence. Courts would lose their integrity by allowing into evidence
the results of improper searches. Id.
6. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955) ("If
the unconstitutional [sic] guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures are
to have significance they must be enforced, and if courts are to discharge their duty
to support the state and federal constitutions they must be willing to aid in their
enforcement."); Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 52, 94 So. 329, 332 (1922) (Judicial re-
sponsibility involves a duty not to "sanction law-breaking and constitutional violation
in order to obtain testimony against another law-breaker."); People v. Brocamp, 307
Il1. 448, 453-54, 138 N.E. 728, 731-32 (1923) (Failure to exclude illegally obtained
evidence reduces both the state and federal constitutional guarantees to a "mere nul-
1086 (Vol. 17
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The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule emerged
in the 1948 decision, Wolf v. Colorado.7 In Wolf, the United
States Supreme Court refused to apply Weeks to state prosecu-
tions. The Court held that the fourth amendment was enforce-
able against the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. However, the remedies for fourth
amendment violations could differ in state and federal court.8
The Court held that relevant evidence obtained by unreasona-
ble search and seizure could be admitted in state prosecutions.
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter justified the
Court's decision not to apply the exclusionary rule to the
states. Exclusion is a remedy that "serves only to protect those
upon whose person or premises something incriminating has
been found."9 Thus, the state's failure to exclude the evidence
did not offend "basic standards."' 0 Justice Frankfurter ac-
knowledged that "in practice the exclusion of evidence may be
an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches . .1.1.""
However, he noted that the states could use other, equally ef-
fective methods to deter police misconduct.' 2 Therefore, the
lity" and "vain boastings." Thus, ajudge has a positive obligation to inquire into the
manner in which evidence was obtained.); Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,
166, 224 S.W. 860, 866 (1920) (The court excluded evidence obtained in warrantless
search because of the court's duty to protect "the citizen in the civil rights guaran-
teed to him by the Constitution."); State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 376, 259 S.W. 100,
108 (1924) ("To admit the evidence is to approve [the] unlawful act [and] is for the
State to become a party to the violation of its own Constitution.")
7. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. Id. at 28.
9. Id. at 31.
10. Id.
11. Id. In contrast, Justice Rutledge's dissent viewed exclusion as constitution-
ally mandated. "[The] Fourth Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence
illegally obtained .. " Id. at 48 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462
(1928)). Justice Rutledge concluded that Congress and the Supreme Court, being
subject to the fourth amendment, are powerless to permit admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence in federal courts. Because the states are equally subject to the fourth
amendment, exclusion is also mandated in state courts. Id.
12. Id. "The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted
against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the commu-
nity itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon re-
mote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country." Id. at 32-33.
Justice Murphy dismissed alternative state remedies as illusory. "The conclusion
is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter violations of the search and seizure
clause." Id. at 44 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Jurisdictions which utilize exclusion, Jus-
tice Murphy argued, succeeded in modifying police conduct. Therefore, exclusion
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states were not required to exclude illegally obtained evidence.
Justice Frankfurter's analysis was rooted in his view of feder-
alism. That view produced a strong "limiting influence on [the
Supreme Court's] role in the criminal cases during the years
before the Warren tenure."'" Yale Kamisar, a critic of Wolf,
observed that the Court had not expressed a deterrence ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule during the thirty-five year in-
terval between Weeks and Wolf.' 4 Professor Kamisar traced the
emergence of the deterrence rationale in Wolf to what he char-
acterized as the seductive quality of the Wolf opinion. In
Kamisar's opinion, Justice Frankfurter, motivated by his view
of the federal system, drove a wedge between the protection of
the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule.' 5 In Weeks,
Justice Frankfurter inferred that the question of whether ille-
gally obtained evidence should be excluded was dependent on
whether exclusion of the evidence would deter future police
misconduct. In Kamisar's opinion, the Supreme Court weak-
ened the exclusionary rule by basing Weeks on the exclusionary
rule's possible consequences as a deterrent.' 6
The deterrence rationale next played a prominent role in the
13. Allen, TheJudicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L. FED'N 518, 526. According to Allen, Wolfwas fueled by the Court's
reluctance to interfere with the operation of basic state institutions. Id. at 526-27.
14. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis"
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 598 (1982-1983)
[hereinafter Kamisar, Principled Basis]. "[Tihere is no suggestion in Weeks or in the
search and seizure cases handed down over the next thirty-five years that the exclu-
sionary rule's survival depends on proof that it is significantly influencing police be-
havior." Id. at 599-600.
15. Id. at 616 (arguingJustice Frankfurter's approach to the rule was not justified
by history).
16. Id.
[By] "inject[ing] the instrumental rationale of deterrence of police miscon-
duct into [the Court's] discussion of the exclusionary rule," and "using the
empirically-based, consequentialist rationale of deterrence as support for
[the Court's] refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to the states," the Wolf
opinion not only made the result reached in that case seem more palatable,
but it planted the seeds of destruction for the exclusionary rule-in federal
as well as state cases.
Id. (quoting Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365 (1981) (footnotes omit-
ted)). Kamisar also traces the emergence of deterrence to the earlier case of United
States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949). Kamisar, Principled Basis, supra
note 14, at 598-99 n.2 10. In Kamisar's view, the Court was speaking to the exploita-
tion of illegality, i.e., "fruit of the poisonous tree," rather than the primary rationale
for exclusion expressed in Weeks. Id. at 604.
1088 [Vol. 17
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1961 landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio.' 7 The Supreme
Court in Mapp overruled Wolf and extended application of the
exclusionary rule to the states. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Clark stated that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is
to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it.' "8 States allowing admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence encouraged disobedience of the Constitution
they are bound to uphold.' 9 Citing the experience of several
states, Justice Clark dismissed any other remedy as "worthless
and futile."' 20 Justice Clark made passing reference to notions
of due process and judicial integrity, but deterrence was clearly
at center stage.
The Supreme Court has shifted its emphasis further in cases
decided subsequent to Mapp. In 1965, the Court observed,
"Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule
within its rights. This, it was found, was the only effective de-
terrent to lawless police action."' 2' "Indeed, all of the cases
since Wolf requiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have
been based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal
police action."'2 2 In 1974, Justice Powell noted: "[T]he rule's
prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct ....
[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent ef-
fect .... The Court reiterated the deterrence rationale in
1976 by observing, if "the exclusionary rule does not result in
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)). Elkins con-
tains a deterrence rationale, but also relies on judicial integrity as a basis for exclu-
sion. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222-23.
19. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
20. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652. However, Yale Kamisar argues that Justice Clark was
trying to secure maximum approval for the decision to overrule Wolf. Thus, Justice
Clark made as strong a case as possible by including deterrence, judicial integrity,
and due process as reasons for excluding the evidence. According to Kamisar, subse-
quent Supreme Court cases have misread Mapp. Kamisar, Principled Basis, supra note
14, at 621-24.
21. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
22. Id. at 636-37.
23. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). In Calandra, Justice
Powell cited Elkins in support of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Id. at
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appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use . . . is unwar-
ranted."24 This statement "indicates that the 'judicial integ-
rity' consideration has been collapsed into the consideration of
'deterrence.' This interpretation completes the transformation
of the exclusionary rule from a doctrine derived, albeit inade-
quately, from constitutional principle, to a rule based on the
judges' assessment of the rule as a deterrent.
25
Before the Wolf decision in 1948, the Supreme Court used
the existence of the fourth amendment and concerns for judi-
cial integrity to exclude illegally obtained evidence. Subse-
quent to Wolf, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
rule only when it would deter police misconduct. This shift in
rationale occurred concurrently with the development of the
inevitable discovery exception in state and federal courts.
Given this change in analysis, early decisions approving the in-
evitable discovery exception discussed the deterrence effect al-
most exclusively.
THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
After developing the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States,26 the United States Supreme Court began to promulgate
exceptions. Illegally obtained evidence is still admissible in
court if it fits within one of the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 7 marked the creation
of the independent source doctrine. The independent source
exception allows courts to admit derivative evidence that
would otherwise be suppressed. The Supreme Court initially
extended the reach of the exclusionary rule to derivative evi-
dence; evidence obtained from the use or exploitation of un-
lawfully obtained evidence was generally determined to be
inadmissible. 28 However, derivative evidence, in some in-
stances, was not "sacred and inaccessible." 29 Thus, the gov-
ernment's ability to demonstrate an independent source for
24. United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
25. Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141, 148 (1978) [hereinafter Sunderland, Exclusionary Rule].
26. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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derivative evidence would allow its admission. 0
The Supreme Court added a further dimension to the exclu-
sion question in Wong Sun v. United States.3 1 Wong Sun reaf-
firmed and expanded Silverthorne. The Court held that some
evidence, though illegally obtained, was far enough removed
from the constitutional violation to be purged of the taint. Not
all evidence, the Court noted, "is 'fruit of the poisonous tree'
simply because it would not have come to light but for the ille-
gal actions of the police."'3 2 The more important question is
" 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at
by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"" The in-
dependent source and the fruit of the poisonous tree excep-
tions, as well as the deterrence rationale, played a central role
in the development of the inevitable discovery exception.
The inevitable discovery exception gained acceptance in
state and federal courts before the Supreme Court considered
the doctrine in 1984.34 State and federal courts that accepted
the inevitable discovery exception relied on language con-
tained in Wong Sun and Silverthorne. The inevitable discovery
exception, to these courts, was invariably the means used to
support admission of evidence obtained in conjunction with
police misconduct.3 5 One might view the deterrence rationale
30. Id.
31. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
32. Id. at 487-88 (quotingJ. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
33. Id. at 488.
34. The inevitable discovery exception was also the subject of scholarly discus-
sion before being recognized by the Supreme Court. Note, The Inevitable Discovery
Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (1974) (preceded
Supreme Court acceptance of the inevitable discovery exception). The author dis-
cussed whether the inevitable discovery exception should apply when an investiga-
tion was prompted as a result of illegally-secured information:
If the illegality was critical in initiating or determining the direction and
form of the investigation, regardless of the legal sufficiency of the untainted
evidence, the defendant's rights were clearly impaired because of the mis-
conduct and the resultant evidence must be excluded. But if in the absence
of the illegality an investigation would have occurred and proceeded in a
manner that would inevitably have led to discovery of the questioned evi-
dence, the police derived no actual benefit from that misconduct, no sub-
stantial infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights took place, and
the evidence can justifiably be admitted.
Id. at 102.
35. United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
marijuana "clearly would have been discovered within a short time through a lawful
1991]
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for exclusion and Wong Sun's sufficiently distinguishable means
test as disparate streams in post-Mapp decisions. However,
these streams were destined to merge when Nix v. Williams36
began its protracted odyssey through state and federal courts.
At journey's end, it appeared that the Supreme Court was un-
concerned with even willful violations of the Constitution. De-
terrence of police misconduct would be the sole consideration
when the Supreme Court considered the inevitable discovery
exception.
NIx v. WILLIAMS
In Nix v. Williams," the defendant was tried and convicted
twice of first-degree murder in the Iowa state courts. The cen-
tral issue in the first case, Brewer v. Williams,38 was whether Wil-
liams' action in leading Des Moines police officers to the
victim's body was admissible. Before surrendering to police in
Davenport, Williams retained an attorney. Williams' lawyer
contacted the Des Moines police and agreed to surrender his
client. Although the matter is not free from dispute, it appears
that the police agreed not to interrogate Williams while he was
being transported from Davenport to Des Moines. Before
investigation already underway"); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914 (1st
Cir. 1980) (holding that scope of investigation lent "credence to the Government's
contention that the travel agency records would have been inevitably discovered dur-
ing routine police investigation"); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1046
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding "leads possessed and being pursued by the police prior to
the occurrence of the illegality would have inevitably led to the discovery of [the
prosecution's primary witness]"); United States v. Schmidt, 573 F.2d 1057, 1065 n.9
(9th Cir. 1978) (admitting evidence because investigation underway would have "al-
most certainly" led to its discovery); United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d
858, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that fingerprint identification would have been
discovered inevitably); Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974)
(admitting weapon on inevitable discovery basis due to the massive nature of the
investigation); United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1053 (4th Cir.) (admitting
confession given to FBI because the evidence was not tainted by unlawful conduct of
local police), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205,
209 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that "sooner or later" police would have obtained the
body by lawful means); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506, 300 N.E.2d 139,
141,346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (admitting gun "where the normal course of police inves-
tigation would ... have inevitably led to such evidence"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973); Oregon v. Miller, 67 Or. App. 637, 647 n.9, 680 P.2d 676, 683 n.9 (1984)
(holding victim's body and evidence resulting from it would have been discovered
inevitably due to normal practice of the hotel).
36. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
37. Id.
38. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
1092 [Vol. 17
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leaving Davenport, Williams was arraigned on the murder
charge. Thus, before the ride with police from Davenport to
Des Moines, two constitutionally significant events took place:
Williams was arraigned and had retained counsel. Thus, the
judicial, as opposed to the investigative, process was clearly
underway.
Shortly after leaving Davenport, the police captain made the
now famous "Christian burial speech." He told Williams:
"I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road.... Number one, I want you to
observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's
freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's
going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting
several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you your-
self are the only person that knows where this little girl's
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if
you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to
find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on
the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and lo-
cate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas eve and murdered.
And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather
than waiting until morning and trying to come back out af-
ter a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at
all." 39
After hearing the speech, Williams led officers to the body.
Williams was not interrogated further nor did he confess to the
actual killing. Williams, not surprisingly, was convicted in the
Iowa courts. The federal district court granted habeas relief,
which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.4 ° The state appealed
this decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
1975.41
The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower federal court's
decision, determined the Christian burial speech was tanta-
mount to interrogation.42 Since Williams had been arraigned
and was represented by counsel, the interrogation violated his
39. Id. at 392-93.
40. Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 509 F.2d 227 (8th
Cir. 1974).
41. Brewer v. Williams, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975).
42. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 400.
1991] 1093
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sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel.43
More significantly for the purposes of this Article, the Court
made the following cryptic statement in a footnote:
While neither Williams' incriminating statements them-
selves nor any testimony describing his having led the po-
lice to the victim's body can constitutionally be admitted
into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of
its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the
body would have been discovered in any event, even had
incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.44
Williams was duly retried. The trial court admitted evidence
of the condition of the victim's body, postmortem chemical
and medical tests, and photographic evidence of her clothing.
The court, in admitting the evidence, found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that, due to a massive systematic search,
the scene would have been discovered in a short time even ab-
sent the proscribed interrogation.4 5
In affirming Williams' second conviction, the Iowa Supreme
Court recognized the inevitable discovery exception as an ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. The Iowa court adopted the
doctrine and its requirement of good faith by police coupled
with a demonstration that the evidence would have been dis-
covered by lawful means. The prosecution would need to
prove both tests by a preponderance of the evidence.46
As to good faith, the Iowa Supreme Court observed:
The issue of the propriety of the police conduct in this case,
as noted earlier in this opinion, has caused the closest possi-
ble division of views in every appellate court which has con-
sidered the question. In light of the legitimate
disagreement among individuals well versed in the law of
criminal procedure who were given the opportunity for
calm deliberation, it cannot be said that the actions of the
police were taken in bad faith.4 7
The court then found that the evidence would, in fact, have
been found by the lawful activity of the search party. To the
Iowa court, legal uncertainty was the equivalent of prima facie
good faith.
43. Id. at 401.
44. Id. at 407 n.12.
45. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 262 (Iowa 1979).
46. Id. at 260.
47. Id. at 260-61.
1094 [Vol. 17
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Williams sought habeas relief a second time in the federal
courts. The district court denied relief" and Williams ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Contrary to the
Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit found that legal un-
certainty did not necessarily constitute good faith. To the
Eighth Circuit, the detective's actions were not "the actions of
a man who believed he was doing the right thing, only to be
confounded later on by a close vote on a question of law."
49
The officer's actions were seen, instead, as a design to obtain
incriminating evidence by mental coercion.5 °
Iowa obtained certiorari5 and the Supreme Court was set to
answer the question it left unanswered in Brewer v. Williams. 52
The question was answered by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Nix v. Williams, authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger.
54
48. Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
49. Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431
(1984).
50. Professor Phillip E. Johnson took issue with the attack of the Eighth Circuit
and noted, "The Court of Appeals opinion is particularly vulnerable on this subject
.... Johnson, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech " Case, 32 EMORY L.J. 349, 369
(1983) [hereinafter Johnson, Christian Burial]. This view was shared by three judges
dissenting from the Eighth Circuit's denial of a motion for rehearing en banc. Judge
Fagg, writing for the dissenters, observed as to all previous proceedings in the sec-
ond round, "I cannot satisfy myself that the issue of the officer's good or bad faith
has ever been the subject of an evidentiary hearing .... [Olur panel is not in a posi-
tion comfortably to find as a matter of law that [the detective] acted in bad faith .... "
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d at 1176 (Fagg, J., dissenting). Professor Johnson further
noted:
[I]t is equally plain that [the detective] meant to learn where the body was
hidden through means that he thought, however mistakenly, to be constitu-
tional. If he had been truly reckless of constitutional standards, he would
not have been so careful to restrict himself to the indirect means he in fact
employed. Not only did he carefully refrain from "questioning," but he
seems to have made no effort to persuade Williams to confess to the killing.
Perhaps it is fair to say that he took a crabbed and legalistic approach to the
word "interrogation," but then so did the four Supreme Court Justices who
agreed with him, and the six Justices who voted to affirm a conviction on
similar facts in Rhode Island v. Innis. Were they all acting in bad faith?
Johnson, Christian Burial, supra, at 368 (footnote omitted). In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a conversation between two police
officers about the danger that a hidden shotgun might be found by a child was not
the equivalent of interrogation under the Miranda rule although it appears to have
been intended for the benefit of the listening suspect who then revealed where he
had left the gun.
51. Nix v. Williams, 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
52. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
53. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
54. Chief Justice Burger was the author of Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205,
209 (D.C. Cir. 1963), one of the earliest inevitable discovery cases.
1991]
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Chief Justice Burger began his analysis by reaffirming the
continuing validity of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
set forth in Wong Sun v. United States.55 He noted that deter-
rence is the core rationale for the "drastic and socially costly"
remedy of exclusion.5 6 The derivative evidence question then
becomes one of not putting the prosecution "in a worse posi-
tion simply because of some earlier police error or miscon-
duct."5 7 The Chief Justice likened the inevitable discovery
exception to the independent source doctrine which was, in his
view, a functionally similar doctrine. Adoption of the inevita-
ble discovery exception would be wholly consistent with the
core rationale of the independent source doctrine.58
Chief Justice Burger noted that, to exclude derivative evi-
dence that inevitably would have been discovered, would put
the prosecution in a worse position. Therefore, no deterrent
purpose would be served by exclusion.
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means-here the volun-
teers' search-then the deterrence rationale has so little ba-
sis that the evidence should be received. Anything less
would reject logic, experience, and common sense.
59
The Chief Justice disagreed that good faith be required for
use of the doctrine. As indicated previously, both the Iowa
Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit viewed a good faith re-
quirement as a necessary prerequisite. Chief Justice Burger,
however, thought a good faith requirement "would place
courts in the position of withholding from juries relevant and
undoubted truth that would have been available to police ab-
sent any unlawful police activity."'60 A good faith requirement
was also rejected because
[a] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain
evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to cal-
culate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be dis-
covered .... On the other hand, when an officer is aware
that the evidence will inevitably be discovered, he will try to
55. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
56. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 442.
57. Id. at 443.
58. Id. at 443-44.
59. Id. at 444 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 445.
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avoid engaging in any questionable practice. In that situa-
tion, there will be little to gain from taking any dubious
"shortcuts" to obtain the evidence. 61
The Chief Justice argued, "Suppression, in these circum-
stances, would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of
the trial process, but would inflict a wholly unacceptable bur-
den on the administration of criminal justice.
62
The inevitable discovery exception as finally defined by the
Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams reflects the shift to a deter-
rence rationale for the exclusionary rule that has developed
since Wolf. Chief Justice Burger's analysis and rejection of a
good faith requirement is cast in terms of its deterrent impact.
The Court appears unconcerned with the gravity, willfulness,
or purposefulness of constitutional violations by law enforce-
ment authorities.
The dissenters, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, ac-
cepted the majority position holding that the inevitable discov-
ery exception was constitutional. Their reservations, however,
concerned the low burden of proof imposed on the prosecu-
tion as a predicate for use of the doctrine in trial courts. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall argued that a clear and convincing
standard, rather than a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard, was appropriate. The higher standard was necessary and
appropriate because of the hypothetical nature of the doctrine.
The inevitable discovery exception, they argued, "differs in
one key respect from its next of kin: specifically, the evidence
sought to be introduced at trial has not actually been obtained
from an independent source, but rather would have been dis-
covered as a matter of course if independent investigations
were allowed to proceed."6 3
The present deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule
provides the only justification for the inevitable discovery ex-
ception as formulated in Nix v. Williams. To the Court, the only
question is whether a given action (police violation) will be dis-
couraged; if not, then the rule is not applicable. In the Court's
view, no deterrent purpose is served by the exclusion of ille-
gally obtained evidence that would have been discovered with-
61. Id. at 445-46 (citation omitted).
62. Id. at 447.
63. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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out the wrongful activity.6 The Court's reasoning is flawed
because it fails to answer a much more fundamental question:
What is the constitutional source of the exclusionary rule?
The answer to that issue may call into question the continuing
validity of both the deterrence rationale and the justification
for the inevitable discovery exception.
From a historical and analytical standpoint, exclusion was
conceived as more than a deterrent. The early cases viewed
exclusion as flowing from both the state and federal constitu-
tions. Exclusion is not merely a judicially created non-consti-
tutional evidentiary concept. Exclusion is inherent in both
judicial review and due process considerations.
Professor Lane Sunderland approaches the exclusionary rule
from a historical perspective. 65 He begins his analysis by fo-
cusing on the Weeks v. United States opinion. To Sunderland,
Weeks stands for the fundamental proposition that "all bodies
entrusted with enforcement of the law including the judiciary,
must enforce [the] law as written."'66 From this premise, Sun-
derland examines both the fourth and fifth amendment. To
Sunderland, the very words of that clause, whatever technical,
procedural, or substantive meaning may be attached to them,
surely mean at least this: the only condition under which one
may be deprived of life, liberty, or property is if the depriva-
tion is in accordance with due process of law. When analyzing
both constitutional amendments, Sunderland argues:
[T]he primary consideration is that of obeying the com-
mands of the Constitution in any proceeding depriving an
individual of life, liberty or property-a requirement the
due process clause makes explicit and mandatory.... Why
the exclusionary rule? Simply because the due process
clause requires it, independently of the efficacy of the rule
as a deterrent, or independently of the comparative efficacy
of alternative remedies. Exclusion is a Constitutional right
emanating from the due process clause.67
64. Id. at 444.
65. See Sunderland, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 25, at 141-42.
66. Id. at 143.
67. Id. at 150. In another article defending the due process basis of exclusion,
Sunderland traced the history of due process from its seminal source, the Magna
Carta, which forbade penalties except by" 'lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.' " Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLoGY 343, 370-72 (1980) (quoting section 29 of the Magna Carta) (foot-
note omitted). Sunderland, paraphrased the due process requirement "to say that
1098 [Vol. 17
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Professor Yale Kamisar, an avid defender of the exclusionary
rule, characterized the rule as simply another form of judicial
review. As first expressed in Marbury v. Madison,68 the courts,
in his view, have a duty not to ignore violations of constitu-
tional commands. Therefore, the exclusionary rule is judicial
review of executive action and is necessary to ensure that the
fourth amendment actually prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. The exclusionary rule is, therefore, a " 'defen-
sive use of Constitutional review.' "69
Viewed in this context, commentators maintain that courts
are compelled to invoke the doctrine of judicial review to vin-
dicate personal constitutional rights violated by unlawful gov-
ernmental actions.70 The courts' failure to do so renders them
derelict in their duty to review executive conduct, and to ex-
clude evidence where appropriate. The remedy of exclusion is
inseparable from the right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure.7 '
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property must be in accordance with the law of the
land, or, at the very least, according to the commands of the authoritative legal decla-
ration of the American law of the land, the Constitution." Id at 372. Indeed, ele-
mentary principles of judicial construction in this light require the instrument to be
read and construed as a whole. The judicial goal should be to give effect to all
clauses. If a judge in determining testamentary intent looks at the whole instrument,
should not the same judge read the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures together with the fifth amendment's guarantee that no citizen
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law? When read
together, the amendments provide a self-evident constitutional basis for the exclu-
sionary rule. Id. at 375. Due process requires that the judiciary review actions of the
executive branch to ensure that the executive branch obeys the law.
68. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
69. Kamisar, Principled Basis, supra note 14, at 592 (quoting Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1). Kamisar further argued: "The Bill of
Rights, especially the fourth amendment, 'reflects experience with police excesses.' "
Id. at 593 (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)). A basic purpose of the Bill of Rights, especially the fourth amendment,
is " 'subordinat[ing] police action to legal restraints.' " Id. at 593 (quoting United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). " '[I]n en-
forcing the fourth amendment, courts mst police the police.' " Id. (quoting Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 371 (1974)).
70. Critics argue that concern about the judicial use of the fruits of fourth
amendment violations is built into the amendment itself. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh,
Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV.
251, 306 (1974). The Court's decision to admit or not admit the evidentiary transac-
tion "deliberately exposes the court, as a direct addressee of the fourth amendment,
to concerns about the Constitutionality of its own participation in the transaction
.... Id. A fourth amendment rationale places the right to exclude directly into the
hands of the defendant, protecting his search and seizure rights. Id. at 271-72.
71. See id. at 342. "Correctly understood, the exclusionary rule in search and
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The deterrence rationale simply fails to answer these argu-
ments in support of a constitutionally-rooted exclusionary
rule. Indeed, the Supreme Court's slide into the deterrence
rationale has been accomplished with almost no examination
of constitutional arguments. Rather, the Court, almost by fiat,
has enthroned the deterrence rationale to the exclusion of any
other basis. Deterrence is unconcerned with the defendant's
personal rights. Instead, the deterrence rationale views the de-
fendant as an accidental beneficiary of a court's supervision of
the police. Deterrence is, by definition, a utilitarian ethic. As
the progeny of deterrence theory, the inevitable discovery ex-
ception is also necessarily unconcerned with ethical considera-
tions or constitutional values that lie beyond the pragmatic.
THE NEED FOR A GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT FOR THE
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
Refinement of the inevitable discovery exception to the ex-
clusionary rule is mandated by the imperative judicial duty to
uphold the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. Ad-
ding a good faith requirement would protect constitutional
rights and address problems with the inevitable discovery ex-
ceptions presently formulated. The inevitable discovery ex-
ception should include a good faith requirement for two
reasons. First, a good faith requirement would curtail consti-
tutional abuse now possible through the inevitable discovery
exception's hypothetical nature and the low standard of proof
currently required. Second, a good faith requirement would
exclude evidence obtained via willful violations, but would not
punish officers acting honestly.
In Nix v. Williams,72 the Supreme Court held that, when evi-
dence is obtained in violation of a defendant's rights, that evi-
dence may still be admitted at the defendant's trial if the
prosecution can prove that the evidence inevitably would have
been discovered by some other means. A hypothetical basis is
all that Nix v. Williams requires. Instead of examining estab-
lished facts, the judge must speculate as to whether the police
seizure cases is rather the expression of the right to a fair prosecution, which means, at
a minimum, constitutional behavior throughout the whole course of governmental
conduct, which in turn means, for example, observance of the fourth amendment by
the executive and review of executive conduct in light of that amendment at trial."
Id.
72. 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
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would have discovered the evidence had they not violated the
defendant's rights. The prosecution only need present a possi-
ble fact scenario to illustrate that the evidence could have been
discovered by legal means. The hypothetical nature of the in-
evitable discovery exception is fraught with potential for
abuse.
73
The low standard of proof required for the inevitable discov-
ery exception in Nix v. Williams makes serious constitutional er-
rors even more probable. Although two justices argued that a
clear and convincing standard should apply,74 the majority
held that the prosecution need only prove inevitable discovery
by a preponderance of the evidence. 75 The hypothetical na-
ture of the inevitable discovery exception, combined with the
low standard of proof required, highlights the need for a good
faith requirement.76 Willful violations of the Constitution are
no barrier to the admission of derivative evidence if the prose-
73. Prior to Nix v. Williams, a commentator expressed concern with the lack of
inquiry into the nature of police misconduct. The writer was concerned with the
hypothetical nature of the exception and distinguished it from the independent
source doctrine. His primary concern was that:
[I]t is very difficult to hypothesize what the police response would be to a
given situation because "it is extremely rare to find a normal, lawful police
procedure which is regularly followed and inevitably would have produced
the same exact information." Just as there is a danger that sophisticated
legal argument will be used to show a causal connection between the initial
illegal conduct and the discovery of derivative evidence, the same "sophisti-
cated argument" aided by hindsight can be used to show what the police
would have done in a given situation.
Note, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 137, 155 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Therefore, the writer
argued,
There are only a few situations where the courts can apply the inevitable
discovery limitation consistently with the deterrence goals of the exclusion-
ary rule. When evidence would have been revealed to the police by opera-
tion of law or by clearly defined police procedures which are regularly
followed, and the police officers have not acted in bad faith to accelerate the
discovery, the doctrine can be applied satisfactorily.
Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted).
74. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 459 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 444.
76. A commentator argued that the majority's
paradoxical statement that whether evidence would have been found "in-
volves no speculative elements" and can easily be based on the facts which
had already occurred .... [P]recisely because of a constitutional violation,
courts will never know if the police investigatory procedures actually would
have discovered the evidence. This inherently speculative nature of the in-
evitable discovery inquiry demands a higher standard of proof.
Comment, Nix v. Williams: An Analysis of the Preponderance Standard for the Inevitable
Discovery Exception, 70 IowA L. REV. 1369, 1379 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
11011991]
17
Fennelly: Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need for a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
cution can demonstrate, by only a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that discovery is hypothetically inevitable.77 The
potential for abuse is great, especially when the doctrine is ap-
plied to a situation involving reckless or intentional violations
of constitutional protections. The inevitable discovery excep-
tion as formulated does not satisfy the judiciary's duty to pro-
tect constitutional rights.
Based on the foregoing, before the doctrine is invoked,
courts should require the prosecution to demonstrate by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that law enforcement officers acted
with an objective good faith belief that their actions were law-
ful. Imposition of a good faith requirement would permit the
present evidentiary standard to be retained. If a court found
that police were acting in good faith, no violence would be
done to due process considerations, then the other test-
whether the evidence would ultimately have been discovered-
can be safely invoked on a preponderance of the evidence
basis.
Critics of the exclusionary rule criticize what is perceived as
its meat-axe approach. As ChiefJustice Burger noted in Nix v.
Williams, honest mistakes by law enforcement officers have
been treated in the same way as flagrant violations of the
fourth amendment.78 One commentator stated: "The disparity
in particular cases between the error committed by the police
officer and the windfall given by the [exclusionary] rule to the
criminal is an affront to popular ideas ofjustice.''79 The inevi-
77. One writer argued that the doctrine should be limited to derivative evidence
and not be applied to primary evidence. Forbes, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Pri-
mary Evidence, and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM U.L. REv. 1221
(1987). Since the Supreme Court has excluded primary evidence coming from an
independent source, the premise is that the inevitable discovery exception should
also exclude primary evidence. Moreover, due to the speculative nature of the inevi-
table discovery exception, courts should be even more reluctant to allow use of such
primary evidence. Id. at 1235-37. This argument against extending the inevitable
discovery exception to primary evidence relies on the Court's precedent. "It is fur-
ther supported by the fact that if the inevitable discovery exception is extended to
primary evidence, there is potential for using the inevitable discovery exception to
obviate the warrant requirement . I..." d. at 1237.
78. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 445 (comparing bad faith and good faith). In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C., dissenting),
Burger argued that "society has at least as much right to expect rationally graded
responses from judges in place of the universal 'capital punishment' we inflict on all
evidence when police error is shown in its acquisition." Id. at 419.
79. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1974).
Judge Malcolm Wilkey offers eleven additional flaws in the exclusionary rule: (1) only
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table discovery exception should be flexible enough to permit
evidence to be admitted when officers make honest mistakes.
Application of the inevitable discovery exception is justified
when officers make honest mistakes because they do not un-
derstand criminal constitutional law. This area of law is both
complex and dynamic. In many instances, the strength of com-
mon law is its ability to adapt principles to changing conditions
in society. In criminal law, such dynamism creates uncertainty
for even the most conscientious officer. One commentator
noted "the undeniable fact that our courts, from the Supreme
Court of the United States on down, have created such an ar-
cane and incomprehensible body of law... that the policeman
on the street simply can't know whether his actions are legally
permissible or not."'8 0 "A police officer will not be deterred
from an illegal search if he does not know it is illegal."'" The
complex body of the law that governs searches, seizures, and
confessions is continually adjusted by courts. Law enforce-
ment personnel are unfairly required to anticipate changes in
application of the exclusionary rule or face exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in good faith.
Addition of a good faith requirement to the inevitable dis-
covery exception will exclude evidence obtained through will-
ful constitutional violations, but will not punish officers acting
honestly. Due to the complexities of criminal constitutional
law, the question should be whether the law enforcement offi-
cials made a good faith attempt to comply with the law.8 2 If the
the guilty benefit, while innocent victims of illegal searches have neither protection
nor remedy; (2) the exclusionary rule vitiates internal discipline in law enforcement
agencies; (3) the rule is an unnecessary and intolerable burden on the court system;
(4) the rule forces the judiciary to perform the executive function of disciplining the
police; (5) the misplaced burden deprives innocent defendants of due process; (6)
the rule encourages perjury by the police; (7) the rule makes hypocrites out of
judges; (8) the high cost of the rule causes the courts to expand the scope of search
and seizure for all citizens; (9) the rule is applied with no sense of proportion to the
crime of the accused; (10) the rule is applied with no sense of proportion to the
misconduct of the officer; and (11) the rule diminishes respect for the judicial pro-
cess, lawyers and laymen alike. Wilkey, Constitutional Alternatives to the Exclusionary
Rule, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 530, 532-33 (1982).
80. Carrington, Good Faith Mistakes and the Exclusionary Rule, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
35, 38 (Summer/Fall 1982).
81. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736,
740 (1972).
82. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court promulgated
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Leon Court held that evidence
seized by officers in good faith reliance on a defective search warrant is admissible in
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answer is yes, then due process is satisfied and the wrongfully
seized evidence is admitted if it would have been discovered
without wrongful conduct.8 3 In the context of the inevitable
discovery exception, good faith can accommodate the evolu-
tion of the law and insure that willful constitutional violations
are not permitted, while still deterring police misconduct.8 4
Two cases involving radically different police activity illus-
trate the need for a good faith requirement. These cases illus-
trate how honest mistakes made by officers might be treated
differently than flagrant abuse. In Brewer v. Williams,85 the
Supreme Court plowed new constitutional ground. The
Supreme Court had not yet refined its concept of what consti-
tuted interrogation when the detective gave the Christian bur-
ial speech. Thus, the errant detective was an actor adrift in the
changing currents of constitutional law. "[I]t is ... plain that
[the detective] meant to learn where the body was hidden
through means he thought, however mistakenly, [were]
court. Id. at 926. Good faith requires that the officer, in obtaining the warrant, not
mislead the magistrate through information known to be false or in reckless disre-
gard for the truth. Id. at 914 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
The Leon Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule should not be used to punish
essentially sound police practices. Id. at 916-24. All the actors in Leon, both judicial
and law enforcement, were mistaken but blameless. Leon's good faith analysis com-
ports with the dynamic and complex nature of search and seizure law. It is also con-
sistent with society's need for effective law enforcement.
83. Sunderland argues that the
relevant question for this inquiry is whether or not the principled argument
supporting the exclusionary rule presented above allows the admission of
evidence obtained under circumstances of minor, technical or non-wilful vi-
olations. The answer is arguably yes. One may, in a manner consistent with
the above arguments supporting the exclusionary rule, specify certain
guidelines limiting application of the rule, guidelines supported by history,
reason and case law.
Sunderland, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 25, at 150. Good faith would satisfy due
process and confine the rule to deterrence of willful constitutional violations.
84. One critic argues that high levels of police misconduct "impact[ ] directly and
significantly on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule." Grossman, The Doc-
trine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable Limitations, 92 DICK. L. REV. 313, 329
(1988). To Grossman, the rule best serves its purpose when applied to bad faith
misconduct by police. He lays out two paradigms, one with, the other without, an
exclusionary rule:
The more purposeful the misconduct, the greater the need to deter and the
more effective is the lesson for those contemplating future illegalities. Con-
versely, allowing the use of evidence which is discovered through a deliber-
ate violation of the law communicates to the police the possibility, if not the
likelihood, of benefiting from their own purposeful wrongdoing.
Id. at 333-34 (footnote omitted).
85. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
1104 [Vol. 17
20





Where the law is unclear, as in Brewer v. Williams, deterrence
cannot play a role. Evidence obtained in good faith, but in a
manner that a court later determines violates the Constitution,
is admitted under the inevitable discovery exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. The additional good faith requirement en-
sures that the admission of the tainted evidence does not
offend due process.
In contrast, Rochin v. California8 7 involved a wholly different
and more egregious set of facts. In Rochin, officers entered the
defendant's home without probable cause. The officers ar-
rested Rochin, took him to a hospital, and had his stomach
pumped to obtain evidence. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the Supreme Court, found:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically.
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally break-
ing into the privacy of [Rochin's home], the struggle to
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible ex-
traction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceed-
ing by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too
close to the rack and the screw to permit ... constitutional
differentiation.88
Justice Frankfurter stated:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause "in-
escapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment
upon the whole course of the proceedings . . . ." Due pro-
cess of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of re-
spect for those personal immunities which . . . are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental "8.... 9
The police conduct in Rochin is intolerable and there exists
no reasonable argument that the police did not recognize it as
such. The inevitable discovery exception should not apply to
circumstances involving willful constitutional violations such as
86. Johnson, Christian Burial, supra note 50, at 368.
87. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
88. Id. at 172.
89. Id. at 169 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416 (1945); Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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those in Rochin.9 ° Where the boundaries are clear, as in Rochin,
deterrence plays a legitimate role. Therefore, where an officer
flagrantly or willfully violates a suspect's constitutional rights,
due process requires exclusion of the evidence flowing from
the constitutional violation. A court's duty in such a situation
is clear. Fidelity to the Constitution demands that the judiciary
refuse to admit the evidence under the inevitable discovery
exception.
A good faith requirement is necessary to prevent use of the
inevitable discovery exception in situations similar to Rochin.
A recent Florida appellate decision demonstrates that the dan-
ger of Rochin-like volitions is not fanciful or speculative. In
Craig v. State,9 a capital murder case, the State of Florida ap-
parently conceded that the defendant's confession was ob-
tained as a result of: (1) an unlawful, forcible, and warrantless
entry into his home; (2) an ineffective waiver of his right to
remain silent; (3) actual threats and coercion; and (4) contin-
ued deceptive and unlawful sequestration of the defendant
while his counsel was attempting to reach him.9 2 Craig's con-
fession contained the location of the bodies and valuable deriv-
ative evidence.93 The Florida Supreme Court applied the
inevitable discovery exception and upheld the admission of all
the evidence based on law enforcement testimony that sink
holes in the area "would have been closely examined" and a
co-defendant's "limited authorization" to inform police the
bodies had been disposed of in "deep water." '94 Noticeably ab-
sent from the discussion is any concern for the admittedly will-
ful and illegal conduct of the police. In contrast to Nix v.
Williams, the officers' actions in Craig were willful, systematic,
and encompassed fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment
violations.
The Craig court made a willing suspension of disbelief. In-
deed, in Craig, a codefendant referred only to "deep water."'95
The record is silent as to how this cryptic reference could have
inevitably (or even possibly) led to the specific location where
90. See Sunderland, Exclusionary Rule, supra note 25, at 150-52.
91. 510 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1987).
92. Id. at 862.
93. Id. at 861.
94. Id. at 862-63.
95. Id. at 863.
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the bodies were found.96 Indeed, if discovery were inevitable,
as the court concluded, law enforcement authorities had no
need to resort to threats and intimidation. More importantly,
if the codefendant's reference to "deep water" and normal in-
vestigative techniques were sufficient, the investigators did not
need the defendant to direct them to the location.97 Common
sense indicates the police were at a dead end and knew it. Po-
lice threats and illegal activity produced the evidence. Nothing
else could have.
Use of the inevitable discovery exception in such an inten-
tionally coercive situation complies with neither the legitimate
goal of deterrence nor due process of law. The addition of a
good faith requirement to the inevitable discovery exception
requires the prosecution to show that police action was not an
intentional violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.
Thus, a good faith requirement would still allow admission of
evidence even though a defendant's constitutional rights were
inadvertently, as opposed to intentionally, violated.
CONCLUSION
The courts' increasing reliance on a deterrence rationale
with little or no discussion of constitutional issues is unfortu-
nate. As the early cases approving exclusion as a remedy
clearly indicate, deterrence was simply not an issue.98 The fail-
ure by the judiciary to consider constitutional issues allows ap-
plication of the inevitable discovery exception without
adequate attention to other policy reasons mandating exclu-
sion of evidence. The concern over the inevitable discovery
exception is in reality only a segment of a much larger, more
fundamental, debate. That debate concerns the exclusionary
rule itself and, essentially, the constitutional basis for the rule.
The shift to deterrence is unfortunate because it obscures or
even ignores ethical considerations. As indicated, that dimen-
sion of the debate has been revived. This is not to say that
ethics and pragmatism are mutually exclusive concepts. Both
supporters and critics may have missed the very beneficial ef-
96. The area in question is located in Lake County, Florida, an area that is honey-
combed with sink holes of varying depth as a result of phosphate mining.
97. Craig, 510 So. 2d at 861.
98. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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fect that the exclusionary rule has on law enforcement agencies
at both the state and federal levels.
Obscured by the smoke and raging battle, the exclusionary
rule contributed to a quiet revolution in American law enforce-
ment.9 9 Stephen H. Sachs, speaking of Maryland law enforce-
ment, points to "a virtual explosion in the amount and
quantity of police training [and sophistication] in the last
twenty years."' 00 Sachs, a career prosecutor, points to the ex-
tensive upgrading of police training as a definite improvement
in the system.' 0 '
Since the 1961 Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio,' °2
prosecutors and police have been unable to rely on involuntary
confessions and the fruits of illegal searches. Improving police
training has also contributed to increased utilization of scien-
tific technologies and new psychological theories to achieve
convictions.103
99. The increasing reliance on the exclusionary rule's ability to deter illegal po-
lice conduct as a justification for the rule raises the issue of whether the rule actually
has such an effect on law enforcement officers. Critics have unleashed a barrage of
statistical attacks and counter-attacks on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.
Professor Dillon Oaks' landmark study sought to measure the exclusionary rule's
deterrent effect on police violations of constitutional rights. Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 666 (1970). The study sought
to measure the rule's effect on police behavior in New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, and
the District of Columbia. Professor Oaks concluded that the exclusionary rule im-
poses excessive costs on the justice system. The rule "creates the occasion and in-
centive for large-scale lying by law enforcement officers." Id. at 755. The
exclusionary rule "diverts the focus of the criminal prosecution from the guilt or
innocence of the defendant to a trial of the police." Id. Based on his study, Oaks
argues, "As to search and seizure violations, the exclusionary rule should be replaced
by an effective tort remedy against the offending officer or his employer." Id. at 756.
Supporters of the exclusionary rule marshalled their own statistical studies. One
ardent supporter of the rule conducted a study in 1983. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585. Ac-
cepting that the exclusionary rule can be justified based on its deterrent effect,
Nardulli concluded that the costs of the rule (lost arrests and convictions) results
only in the release of a few marginal offenders. Id. at 606-07. This "minuscule"
effect is more than outweighed by the rule's deterrent effect. Id. at 607. Another
study which assessed available empirical evidence concluded that the exclusionary
rule was a minor factor in explaining the disposition of felony arrests. Davies, A Hard
Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule:
The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 677-
86.
100. Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 28, 31
(Summer/Fall 1982).
101. Id.
102. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
103. Florida's case law illustrates this trend. See, e.g., Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d
1108 [Vol. 17
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INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
Truly professional law enforcement inevitably improves the
accuracy of trial results. Fair and accurate trials are fundamen-
tal to the integrity of the truth-seeking process. An accurate
and just result in conformity with the law vindicates the Consti-
tution and the legal system. From this standpoint, use of the
inevitable discovery exception without a good faith require-
ment is a step backward. Use of the bare inevitable discovery
exception will discourage further improvements in law en-
forcement training that has occurred in response to the exclu-
sionary rule and has arguably improved the accuracy of trial
results. Addition of a good faith requirement to the inevitable
discovery exception will improve the integrity of the legal
process.
392 (Fla. 1984) (neutron trace evidence used to prove presence of gunshot residues);
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (DNA testing and com-
parison used to prove identity in rape case); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (post traumatic stress syndrome testimony used to corroborate
testimony child victim of sexual abuse), appeal dismissed, 507 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987);
Bradford v. State, 460 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (photographs of abrasion
patterns on defendant's hands compared to models of victim's teeth), review denied,
467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(voice prints used to identify person who telephoned bomb threats); Coppolino v.
State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (novel chemical test to determine
presence of drug and cause of death), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). These cases,
of course, do not reflect the more mundane, daily use of ballistics, fingerprints, hair
comparisons, and toolmark identifications in criminal cases.
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